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1 Introduction
Recent accounts of actual causation are stated in terms of extended causal models.
These extended causal models contain two elements representing two seemingly
distinct modalities. The first element are structural equations which represent the
“(causal) laws” or mechanisms of the model, just as ordinary causal models do.
The second element are ranking functions which represent normality or typicality.
The aim of this paper is to show that these two modalities can be unified. I will
do so by formulating two constraints under which extended causal models with
their two modalities can be subsumed under so called “counterfactual models”
which contain just one modality. These two constraints will be formally precise
versions of Lewis’ (1979) familiar “system of weights or priorities” governing
overall similarity between possible worlds.
Here is my strategy in a bit more detail. Elsewhere I have introduced counter-
factual models which contain one element representing one modality: objective
ranking functions representing counterfactuality. In a first step I will generalize
extended causal models by relaxing certain restrictions. If anything, this makes
my task more difficult. In a second step I will interpret the ranking functions in
these generalized extended causal models objectively as in counterfactual mod-
els. In a third step I will formulate two constraints on these generalized and
objectively interpreted extended causal models. The first constraint relates struc-
tural equations and ranking functions. It is reminiscent of Lewis’ (1979: 472)
two conditions that “[i]t is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, di-
verse violations of law” and that “[i]t is of the third importance to avoid even
small, localized, simple violations of law.” I will show that extended causal mod-
els satisfying this first constraint can be subsumed under counterfactual models.
The second constraint relates ranking functions and actuality. It is reminiscent of
Lewis’ (1979: 472) condition that “[i]t is of the second importance to maximize
the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of particular fact pre-
vails.” I will show that extended causal models that satisfy this second constraint
in addition to the first constraint can be subsumed under counterfactual models in
a conservative way. By that I mean that all counterfactual claims as well as all
claims about lawhood, causality, and actuality are conserved. Therefore, given
these two constraints, there is only one modality that is needed to model actual
causation and causality in general. That one modality is counterfactuality, which
unifies the two modalities of “(causal) laws” or mechanisms and of normality or
typicality that figure in extended causal models. This unification is achieved by a
formally precise version of Lewis’ (1979: 472) “system of weights or priorities.”
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This result is primarily a result about counterfactuals. However, it may impact
the theory of causality in the following way. On the new picture of extended causal
models, actual causation is the wrong concept to focus on, because it is a hybrid
that involves two seemingly distinct modalities. On this view the concept to focus
on is the notion of a “(causal) law” or mechanism as represented by a structural
equation. In combination with normality or typicality, as well as what is actually
the case, “(causal) laws” or mechanisms somehow give rise to actual causation.
On a more traditional picture the concept to focus on is that of actual causation,
which is to be analyzed in terms of counterfactuals (Lewis 1973a, 1986a, 2000).
I do not want to take sides on the issue of which causal notion to focus on. The
issue I want to take sides on is how to represent counterfactuals. The traditional
picture has come under attack because it has the wrong theory of counterfactuals
(Lewis 1973b, 1979). The new picture of extended causal models receives incred-
ulous stares because it has an incomplete theory of counterfactuals. It reaches for a
second modality in order to compensate for this incompleteness. However, in con-
trast to the first modality of “(causal) laws” or mechanisms the second modality of
normality or typicality seems to be partly subjective. This flies in the face of the
seemingly objective nature of actual causation. Hence the incredulous stares. The
present account corrects the theory of counterfactuals underlying the traditional
picture. It completes the theory of counterfactuals underlying the new picture by
unifying the two modalities of the latter. Therefore the present account provides
the framework in terms of which a counterfactual theory of causality should be
formulated, if one wants to defend such a theory.1
1For a quite different way of relating ranking functions and structural equations via causation
see Spohn (2010).
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2 Structural Equations and Defaults
The most promising framework for analyzing causation seems to be the structural
equations approach (Spirtes & Glymour & Scheines 2000, Pearl 2009: ch. 7; see
also Halpern & Pearl 2005a and 2005b and Hitchcock 2001 and 2007). While
structural equations are primarily used for the analysis of causation, they are of
independent interest for studying the logic of counterfactuals (see Briggs 2012 and
Halpern forthcoming). I will touch upon some issues in this connection below, but
first we have to get started. The following definition is due to Halpern (2008).
M = (S,F ) is a causal model if and only if S is a signature and F =
{F1, . . . ,Fn} represents a set of nmodifiable structural equations. S = (U,V,R) is
a signature if and only ifU is a finite set of exogenous variables,V = {V1, . . . ,Vn}
is a set of n endogenous variables disjoint fromU, and R : U ∪V → R assigns
each variable X inU ∪V its range R (X) ⊆ R. W = ×X∈U∪VR (X) is the set of
possible worlds.
F = {F1, . . . ,Fn} represents a set of n modifiable structural equations if and
only if each Fi is a function fromWi = ×X∈U∪V\{Vi}R (X) into the range R (Vi) of
the endogenous variable Vi. A causal modelM = (S,F ) is acyclic if and only if
there is no cycle Vi1, . . . ,Vim,Vi1 in V such that the value of Fi( j+1) depends on
R
(
Vi j
)
for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1, and the value of Fi1 depends on R (Vim). Dependence
is functional dependence: Fi depends on R
(
V j
)
just in case there are ~wi and ~wi
′
in Wi = ×X∈U∪V\{Vi}R (X) that differ only in the value from R
(
V j
)
such that
Fi
(
~wi
)
, Fi
(
~wi
′).
Let Pa (Vi) be the set of exogenous or endogenous variables X in U ∪ V
such that Fi depends on R (X). The members of Pa (Vi) are called the parents of
the endogenous variable Vi. Let An (Vi) be the ancestral, or transitive closure,
of Pa (Vi), which is defined inductively as follows. Pa (Vi) ⊆ An (Vi); and if
V ∈ An (Vi), then Pa (V) ⊆ An (Vi). The members of An (Vi) are called the
ancestors of the endogenous variable Vi. They are the parents of Vi, Pa (Vi), and
the parents of all parents (but excluding Vi itself, unless the model is cyclic).
A context is a specification of the values of all exogenous variables and so can
be formalized as a vector ~u in R (U) = ×U∈UR (U). A basic fact about causal
models is that every acyclic causal model has a unique solution for any context.
An acyclic causal model can be represented by a directed acyclic graph whose
nodes are the exogenous and endogenous variables inU ∪V and whose arrows
point into each endogenous variable Vi from all of the latter’s parents in Pa (Vi).
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The signature provides the framework or language of the model. It contains
more structure than a set of possible worlds, because there is a distinction between
exogenous and endogenous variables. What may be even more important is the
way one understands these variables. I understand them as singular variables and
briefly want to explain why.
Philosophers such as Woodward (2003), following the lead of Spirtes & Gly-
mour & Scheines (2000) and Pearl (2009), are mainly interested in causal rele-
vance between properties rather than actual causation between events (or, more
cautiously, the relata of actual causation; see Paul 2000). That is, they under-
stand the variables in the generic way they are understood in science, especially
those areas of science that rely on statistical methods, as assigning values to a
population of individuals from which one can draw samples. For instance, the
population may be the set of people at a certain age and in a certain geographi-
cal region, and the generic variable may assign values to these individuals – say,
value i is assigned to an individual in that population if i mg ibuprofen are ad-
ministered to that individual. With this generic understanding of the variables it
might indeed be possible to test counterfactual claims of what would happen un-
der certain interventions by “carry[ing] out the interventions described in the[...]
antecedents and then check[ing] to see whether certain correlations hold” (Wood-
ward 2003: 72-73). For instance, it might indeed be possible to test the causal
relevance claim that the administration of ibuprofen causes relief of pain by car-
rying out the intervention of administering a certain number of mg ibuprofen to
some select subgroup of the population and then checking if pain is relieved in the
members of that group.2
However, we cannot use generic variables if we want to construct a set of pos-
sible worlds in the way we have done above. In order to understand the Cartesian
product of all possible values of all variables as a set of possible worlds we have to
understand the variables in a singular sense. Otherwise the resulting possibilities
are not exclusive. For instance, the variable may assign value i to a possible world
if i mg ibuprofen are administered to me at noon on July 1, 2014, in that possible
world. By moving from generic variables to singular variables we may lose some
connection to science, but we get closer to philosophy. The reason is that now we
can understand better the counterfactual claims implicit in a causal claim. Here is
how.
2It is not entirely clear to me how Woodward (2003) can distinguish between the test of a
counterfactual conditional, the test of an indicative conditional, and the test of a claim about con-
ditional probabilities. How to empirically test or confirm counterfactuals on the account presented
in section 4 is explained in Author (ms 1).
5
If we can interpret the Cartesian product of all possible values of all variables
as a set of possible worlds, then we can rely on a well-developed theory of coun-
terfactuals. According to that theory a counterfactual conditional of the from ‘if A
were the case, then C would be the case’ is true at a world if C is true in all worlds
of a certain subset of the A-worlds. This understanding of counterfactuals is not
obviously available if we work with generic variables. The reason is that it is not
obvious how to construct possible worlds out of generic variables. And even if
one has succeeded in constructing possible worlds out of generic variables, it is
not obvious how to understand counterfactuals in the sense of this theory while
still be able to test them in the way envisaged by Woodward (2003) and sketched
above.
Another reason why it is important to understand the variables of the causal
model as singular variables is that the restriction to acyclic causal models, which
will be important later on, is only plausible for singular variables. For generic
variables acyclicity is clearly false. A related point is made by Kistler (forthcom-
ing).
Pearl (2009: ch. 10) and Hitchcock (2001) and Woodward (2003: sct. 2.7)
and Halpern & Pearl (2005a) have provided increasingly sophisticated definitions
of actual causation in terms of acyclic causal models (the particular way these
authors formalize causal models differs in detail). However, Hiddleston (2005)
presents two acyclic causal models where the “intuitively correct” causal judg-
ments differ, even though the two models are isomorphic (two examples illus-
trating this point will be presented in the next section). As Halpern (2008) puts
it: “there must be more to causality than just the structural equations.” I will re-
fer to this claim as the insufficiency thesis: structural equations representing the
“(causal) laws” or mechanisms of a model are insufficient for causality.
In order to solve this problem Hall (2007) and Hitchcock (2007) distinguish
between normal or default values and abnormal or deviant values of a variable.
In Halpern (2008) and Halpern & Hitchcock (2010) these defaults are modeled
in terms of ranking functions (Spohn 1988). The latter are defined as follow. A
function % : W → N is a ranking function if and only if % assigns rank 0 to
at least one possible world w in W. Usually ranking functions are interpreted
epistemically as grades of disbelief, and then their defining clause is a consis-
tency constraint saying that one should not disbelieve every possible world. A
ranking function % on the set of possible worlds W is extended to a function
%+ : ℘ (W) → N ∪ {∞} on the powerset of (the propositions over)W, ℘ (W),
by setting %+ (A) = min
{
% (w) : w ∈ A ⊆W} and %+ (∅) = ∞. I will abuse nota-
tion and write ‘%’ instead of ‘%+’.
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M = (S,F , %) is an extended (acyclic) causal model if and only if (S,F )
is a(n) (acyclic) causal model and % is a ranking function on W. As suggested
– unintentionally, but nevertheless appropriately – by Halpern (2008: sct. 4), the
ranking function % should be indexed to the set of contexts, because what is normal
may vary from context to context. Thus, extended (acyclic) causal models really
are of the formM =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)), where R (U) = ×U∈UR (U) is the set of
all contexts or specifications of the values of all exogenous variables.
The definition of actual causation then runs as follows (Halpern & Hitchcock
2010: sct. 3). X1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xk = xk, or simply: ~X = ~x, is an actual cause of φ
in the extended acyclic causal modelM =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) in context ~u if and
only if:
1. ~X = ~x and φ are true inM in ~u.
2. There is a partition
{
~Z, ~W
}
of the endogenous variables V with ~X ⊆ ~Z,
and there are vectors of values ~x′ and ~w of ~X and ~W, respectively, with
%~u
(
~X = ~x′ ∧ ~W = ~w
)
≤ %~u (w~u) such that: if ~Z = ~z∗ is true inM in ~u, then
(a) ~X = ~x′ ∧ ~W = ~wSE ¬φ is true inM in ~u; and
(b) for all ~W− ⊆ ~W and all ~Z− ⊆ ~Z: ~X = ~x ∧ ~W− = ~w ∧ ~Z− = ~z∗SE φ
is true inM in ~u.
3. There is no proper subset ~X− of ~X such that 1. and 2. hold for ~X−.
In order to understand this definition we need to know the truth conditions for
counterfactuals of the form ~X = ~x SE φ in an extended acyclic causal model
M in a context ~u. It is these counterfactuals that are my main target. In what
follows I will ignore the use/mention distinction whenever possible so that the
notation does not become even more cumbersome.
For an endogenous variable X inV and a value x in R (X), X = x is an atomic
sentence. An atomic sentence X = x is true inM in ~u just in case all solutions to
the equations represented by F assign value x to the endogenous variable X when
the exogenous variables are set to ~u. Since we are restricting the discussion to
extended acyclic causal models which have a unique solution in any given context,
this means that X = x is true inM in ~u if and only if x is the value of X in the
unique solution to all equations inM in ~u. The truth conditions for negations and
conjunctions are given in the usual way.
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A counterfactual X1 = x1 ∧ . . .∧Xk = xk SE φ, or simply: ~X = ~xSE φ,
is true in M in ~u just in case φ is true in M~X=~x =
(
S~X,F ~X=~x
)
(but the same
~u). The latter model results from M by replacing the equations for Xi by the
equations Xi = xi, i = 1, . . . , k. Formally this means two things (i-ii).
(i) The signatureS is reduced toS~X =
(U,V \ {X1, . . . ,Xk} ,R |U∪V\{X1,...,Xk}),
where R |U∪V\{X1,...,Xk} is R with its domain restricted from U ∪V to U ∪V \{X1, . . . ,Xk}.
(ii) F is reduced to F ~X=~x which results from F by deleting the functions
FXi representing the equations for Xi and by changing the remaining functions
FY in F \ {FX1 , . . . ,FXk} as follows. First, restrict the domain of each FY from
×X∈U∪V\{Y}R (X) to ×X∈U∪V\{Y,X1,...,Xk}R (X). Second, replace FY by F~X=~xY which
results from FY by setting X1, . . . ,Xk to x1, . . . , xk, respectively.
While this definition is fairly complicated, the idea behind it is quite simple.
In evaluating the counterfactual ~X = ~x SE φ in model M in context ~u, first
validate the antecedent by deleting the equations for the endogenous variables ~X
and setting their values to ~x. In a second step set the exogenous variables to ~u and
let the remaining equations determine the values of the remaining endogenous
variables. In a third step check if the resulting solution yields the right value for
φ.
The equations represent the “(causal) laws” or mechanisms of the model. It is
important to stress the relativity to the model and that laws, as understood here,
may fail to meet many of the traditional criteria for lawfulness (Woodward 2003:
ch. 6). The laws of the model can represent the workings of your fridge, the
economics of the food market in the country I live in, the laws of gravitation of
some planetary system, or Schrödinger’s Equation.
Several features of the formal language from above are worth being pointed
out. First, all sentences are built up from endogenous variables. Second, Structural
-Equations-counterfactuals or SE-counterfactuals cannot be iterated (embeddings
can be defined, though, as shown by Halpern forthcoming). Third, the antecedents
of SE-counterfactuals are restricted to non-empty conjunctions of atomic sen-
tences, although the consequents of SE-counterfactuals can be arbitrary Boolean
combinations of atomic sentences.
As Halpern & Hitchcock (2010) note, the introduction of defaults makes the
notion of actual causation doubly “subjective” (Halpern & Hitchcock 2010: 384)
or relative: judgments of actual causation depend on the choice of the exogenous
and endogenous variables and on the choice of the default values for these vari-
ables. Let us look at their FIRE example.
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Endogenous variable L takes on the value 1 if there is lightning, and 0 other-
wise. Endogenous variableM takes on the value 1 if there is an arsonist dropping a
lit match, and 0 otherwise. Endogenous variable F takes on the value 1 if there is a
forest fire, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore exogenous variable (UL,UM) determines
the values of L and M. The functions FL :
((
i, j
)
,m, f
) 7→ i, FM : ((i, j) , l, f ) 7→ j,
and FF :
((
i, j)
)
, l,m
) 7→ max {l,m} describe the following equations:
• (UL,UM)
• L = UL
• M = UM
• F = L ∨M
According to Halpern & Hitchcock (2010), in the context where UL = 1 and
UM = 1 so that there is lightning (L = 1) and there is an arsonist dropping a lit
match (M = 1) and there is a forest fire (F = 1), the arsonist’s dropping a lit match
(M = 1) is an actual cause of the forest fire (F = 1). This is so, because:
1. M = 1 and F = 1 are true inM in (uL,uM) = (1, 1).
2. For the partition {{M,F} , {L}} and the values 0 and 0 of M and L we have
%(1,1) (M = 0 ∧ L = 0) ≤ %(1,1) (w(1,1)) and: (M,F) = (1, 1) is true in M in
(1, 1) and
(a) M = 0 ∧ L = 0SE F , 1 is true inM in (1, 1), and so are
(b) M = 1 SE F = 1, M = 1 ∧ F = 1 SE F = 1, M = 1 ∧ L =
0SE F = 1, M = 1 ∧ L = 0 ∧ F = 1SE F = 1.
3. There is no proper subset of {M} such that 1. and 2. hold.
The relevant inequality for the ranking function %(1,1) says that the most typical
world where there is no lightning and no arsonist dropping a lit match is at least
as typical as the actual world where there are lightning and an arsonist dropping
a lit match and a forest fire. This equation holds (in the context where UL = 1
and UM = 1) for the following reason. It is more typical that there is no lightning
(L = 0) than that there is lightning (L = 1). It is more typical that there is no
arsonist dropping a lit match (M = 0) than that there is an arsonist dropping a lit
match (M = 1). It is more typical that there is no forest fire (F = 0) than that there
is a forest fire (F = 1).
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In addition to this the structural equations seem to put a constraint on the
ordering of normality or typicality. Even though it is more typical that there is no
forest fire than that there is a forest fire, it is more typical that there is lightning
and a forest fire than that there is lightning and no forest fire. Similarly, even
though it is more typical that there is no forest fire than that there is a forest fire,
it is more typical that there are an arsonist dropping a lit match and a forest fire
than that there is an arsonist dropping a lit match and no forest fire. Finally, even
though it is more typical that there is no forest fire than that there is a forest fire, it
is much more typical that there are lightning and an arsonist dropping a lit match
and a forest fire than that there are lightning and an arsonist dropping a lit match,
but there is no forest fire. And this is so no matter which context we are in.
More generally, the structural equations seem to put the following constraint
on the ordering of normality or typicality. It seems that worlds which violate an
equation are less typical than worlds that obey all equations (the latter are called
“legal” in Glymour et al. 2010). And it seems that worlds violating certain equa-
tions and then some are less typical than worlds violating only certain equations.
It is easy to see, though, that this constraint does not hold for equations such as
L = UL and M = UM, if only because we do not know what UL and UM stand for.
However, it would be wrong to take this as a reason to reject the constraint that the
structural equations seem to put on the ordering of normality or typicality. The
fact that the constraint does not hold for equations such as L = UL and M = UM
should rather be taken as a reason to reject the above model.
Let me explain. The only reason Halpern & Hitchcock (2010) include the
“dummy variables” UL and UM and the “dummy equations” U = UL and U = UM
is that they want to say that L = 1 andM = 1 are actual causes of F = 1, but cannot
do so unless both L and M are endogenous variables. Besides that these variables
and equations do no work and could be dropped if the artificial restriction were
not in place that only endogenous variables can be causally efficacious. If that
restriction were not in place, L and M would be the exogenous variables, and
F = L ∨ M the only equation. Indeed, this is the model one would use in the
framework of Hitchcock (2007).
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3 Generalizing Causal Models
FIRE example, version 2:
Let exogenous variable L take on the value 1 if there is lightning, and 0 other-
wise. Let exogenous variable M take on the value 1 if there is an arsonist dropping
a lit match, and 0 otherwise. Let endogenous variable F take on the value 1 if there
is a forest fire, and 0 otherwise. The function FF : (l,m) 7→ max {l,m} describes
the following equation:
• L
• M
• F = L ∨M
In this model it is true that worlds that violate an equation are less typical than
worlds that obey all equations. My first proposal therefore is to relax the restric-
tion in the (extended acyclic) causal models of Halpern (2008) and Halpern &
Hitchcock (2010) and define an atomic sentence to be of the form X = x for an
exogenous or endogenous variable X inU∪V and a value x in R (X). Then we do
not have to include arbitrary exogenous variables to render L and M endogenous
and thus be able to state counterfactual and causal claims with them.
For this to make sense we have to define the truth conditions for sentences in
a slightly different way. An atomic sentence X = x is true inM in ~u just in case
all solutions to the equations represented by F when the exogenous variables are
set to ~u assign value x to the exogenous or endogenous variable X. Since we keep
restricting the discussion to acyclic models which have a unique solution in any
context, this means that X = x is true inM in ~u if and only if x is the value of X in
the unique solution to all equations inM in ~u. The truth conditions for negations
and conjunctions are again given in the usual way.
A counterfactual X1 = x1 ∧ . . .∧Xk = xk SE φ, or simply: ~X = ~xSE φ,
is true in M in ~u just in case φ is true in M~X=~x =
(
S~X,F ~X=~x
)
in ~u~X=~x. The
latter model and context result fromM and ~u by replacing the equations for Xi
by the equations Xi = xi, i = 1, . . . , k. Formally this means two things (i-ii).
(i) The signature S is reduced to S~X =
(U,V \ {X1, . . . ,Xk} ,R |U∪(V\{X1,...,Xk})),
where R |U∪(V\{X1,...,Xk}) is R with its domain restricted from the originalU∪V to
those variablesU ∪ (V \ {X1, . . . ,Xk}) that remain after deleting the endogenous
variables among {X1, . . . ,Xk}.
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(ii) F is reduced to F ~X=~x which results from F by deleting the functions FXi
representing the equations for the endogenous Xi and by changing the remaining
functions FY in F \ {FX1 , . . . ,FXk} as follows. First, restrict the domain of each
FY from ×X∈U∪V\{Y}R (X) to ×X∈U∪(V\{Y,X1,...,Xk})R (X). Second, replace FY by F~X=~xY
which results from FY by setting X1, . . . ,Xk to x1, . . . , xk, respectively.
The new context ~u~X=~x results from the original context ~u as follows. First,
set the values of the exogenous variables among {X1, . . . ,Xk} to x1, . . . , xk, re-
spectively. Second, leave the values of the other exogenous variables in U \
{X1, . . . ,Xk} as they are in ~u.
The definition of actual causation has to be changed slightly: in clause (2) we
consider a partition of all variables, exogenous or endogenous,U∪V rather than
a partition of the endogenous variablesV only.
The SURVIVAL example (Halpern & Hitchcock 2010: 400) explains why we
need ranking functions in addition to the structural equations. Let exogenous
variable A take on the value 1 if Assassin does not put in poison, and 0 otherwise.
Let exogenous variable B take on the value 1 if Bodyguard puts in antidote, and
0 otherwise. Let endogenous variable S take on the value 1 if Victim survives,
and 0 otherwise. The function FS : (a, b) 7→ max {a, b} describes the following
equation:
• A
• B
• S = A ∨ B
The structural equation for the SURVIVAL example is isomorphic to that for the
FIRE example, version 2. However, people have different intuitions about the
correct causal judgment for these two examples. In the FIRE example, version 2
people say that the arsonist’s dropping a lit match is an actual cause of the forest
fire if there are lightning and an arsonist dropping a lit match (and a forest fire).
In the SURVIVAL example people do not say that Bodyguard’s putting in antidote
is an actual cause of Victim’s survival, if Bodyguard puts in antidote and Assassin
does not put in poison (and Victim survives). This difference in people’s intuitions
about the correct causal judgment is explained by appeal to normality or typicality.
While the structural equation for the SURVIVAL example is isomorphic to that for
the FIRE example, version 2, the ordering of normality or typicality for the former
differs from that of the latter in the following way.
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It is more typical that Assassin does not put in poison (A = 1) than that As-
sassin puts in poison (A = 0). It is more typical that Bodyguard does not put in
antidote (B = 0) than that Bodyguard puts in antidote (B = 1). It is more typical
that Victim survives (S = 1) than that Victim does not survive (S = 0). In ad-
dition to this the structural equation seems to put a constraint on the ordering of
normality or typicality. Even though it is more typical that Victim survives than
that Victim does not survive, it is more typical that Assassin puts in poison and
Bodyguard does not put in antidote and Victim does not survive than that Assassin
puts in poison and Bodyguard does not put in antidote and Victim survives.
This helps us see why Bodyguard’s putting in antidote is no actual cause of
Victim’s survival, if Bodyguard puts in antidote and Assassin does not put in poi-
son and Victim survives, A = 1, B = 1, and S = 1.
1. B = 1 and S = 1 are true inM in (a, b) = (1, 1); but
2. for the partition {{B,S} , {A}} (and any other partition) there are no values b
and a of B and A with %(1,1) (B = b ∧ A = a) ≤ %(1,1) (w(1,1)) and: (B,S) =
(1, 1) is true inM in (1, 1) and
(a) B = b ∧ A = aSE S , 1 is true inM in (1, 1), and so are
(b) B = 1SE S = 1, B = 1 ∧ S = 1SE S = 1, B = 1 ∧ A = aSE
S = 1, B = 0 ∧ A = a ∧ S = 1SE S = 1; and
3. there is no proper subset of {B} such that 1. and 2. hold.
The reason is that the values b and a of B and A needed for B = b ∧ A = a 
S , 1 to come out true inM in (1, 1) are 0 and 0. However, any world in which
Bodyguard does not put in antidote and Assassin puts in poison, i.e. where B =
0 ∧ A = 0 is true, is less typical than the actual world w(1,1) where Bodyguard
puts in antidote and Assassin does not put in poison – or so Halpern & Hitchcock
(2010: sct. 5) claim.
In fact, however, this is not true for the ranking function used by Halpern &
Hitchcock (2010). Their ranking function assigns rank 1 to both the world that
would be needed where Bodyguard does not put in antidote and Assassin puts
in poison, as well as to the actual world where Bodyguard puts in antidote but
Assassin does not put in poison. What is true, though, is that the world that would
be needed where Bodyguard does not put in antidote and Assassin puts in poison
is less typical than the most typical world where Assassin does not put in poison,
viz. the world where Bodyguard does not put in antidote and Assassin does not
put in poison.
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We therefore have to slightly adjust the definition of actual causation (in the
spirit of Hitchcock 2007, who also refers to the actual value of ~W rather than the
actual world) as follows: in condition (2), %~u
(
~X = ~x′ ∧ ~W = ~w
)
≤ %~u
(
~W = ~w~u
)
,
where ~w~u is the actual value of ~W in modelM in context ~u.
For the sake of completeness I state the slightly revised definition of actual
causation in extended acyclic causal models: X1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xk = xk, or
simply: ~X = ~x, is an actual cause of φ in the extended acyclic causal model
M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) in context ~u if and only if:
1. ~X = ~x and φ are true inM in ~u.
2. There is a partition
{
~Z, ~W
}
of all variables, exogenous or endogenous,U ∪
V with ~X ⊆ ~Z, and there are vectors of values ~x′ and ~w of ~X and ~W,
respectively, with %~u
(
~X = ~x′ ∧ ~W = ~w
)
≤ %~u
(
~W = ~w~u
)
such that: if ~Z = ~z∗
is true inM in ~u, then
(a) ~X = ~x′ ∧ ~W = ~wSE ¬φ is true inM in ~u; and
(b) for all ~W− ⊆ ~W and all ~Z− ⊆ ~Z: ~X = ~x ∧ ~W− = ~w ∧ ~Z− = ~z∗SE φ
is true inM in ~u.
3. There is no proper subset ~X− of ~X such that 1. and 2. hold for ~X−.
This completes the first step of my argument as it was outlined in the Introduction.
In a second step I now want to step back from Halpern & Hitchcock’s (2010)
interpretation of the ranking functions %~u. Instead of interpreting them solely in
terms of normality or typicality, I propose to interpret them as that notion – let us
call it (counterfactual) distance – that gives truth conditions to counterfactuals. In
the way I propose to interpret them, ranking functions represent a modality, the
modality of counterfactuality, that is as objective as counterfactuals are. Therefore
I will refer to them as objective ranking functions.
Counterfactual distance figures as a primitive on my account. It is the same
notion that Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973a; 1979) interpret in terms of overall
similarity between possible worlds. While I do not think that overall similarity
is an adequate interpretation of counterfactual distance (else I would not treat the
latter as primitive), it may be helpful to the reader to think of objective ranking
functions as formalizing overall similarity.
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This formalization in terms of objective ranking functions differs slightly3
from Stalnaker’s (1968) formalization in terms of selection functions and from
Lewis’ (1973a) formalization in terms of a system of spheres. However, these
slight differences do not affect the logic of counterfactuals in any way that is rel-
evant for present purposes.4
Interim report: I have taken Halpern’s (2008) notion of an extended (acyclic)
causal model in terms of which Halpern & Hitchcock (2010) define actual cau-
sation. First I have slightly generalized these models by indexing the ranking
functions in them to the contexts rather than assuming one fixed ranking func-
tion for all contexts. Then I have further generalized these models in the spirit of
Hitchcock (2007) by dropping the restriction that only endogenous variables can
be causally efficacious. Finally, after fixing a small bug in the definition of actual
causation I have re-interpreted the ranking functions in these generalized extended
(acyclic) causal models objectively as that notion which gives truth conditions to
counterfactuals. This completes the first and second step of my argument as it was
outlined in the Introduction. In the next three sections I will carry out the third
step.
3The difference is that the limit assumption, which is rejected by Lewis (1973), holds on the
formalization in terms of objective ranking functions.
4One reason why I think that similarity is not an adequate interpretation of counterfactual dis-
tance is that the axiom(s) of strong centering (and weak centering) come out as (analytic) truths
on this interpretation. I think that neither strong centering nor weak centering holds for counter-
factuals. For criticism of similarity see Hájek (ms). For criticism of weak centering and strong
centering see Leitgeb (2012a; 2012b) and Menzies (2004: sct. 6).
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4 Laws and Counterfactuality
As stressed by Collins & Hall & Paul (2004: 2ff) the logical properties of the
counterfactual conditional do not suffice for a counterfactual theory of causation,
if only because they do not exclude backtracking counterfactuals. This is why
Lewis (1979) imposes four constraints on the similarity relation that is governing
the logic of counterfactuals on his account, in addition to its defining features that
fix the logical properties of the counterfactual conditional via the system VC.
I will impose two constraints as well.5 The first constraint concerns the rela-
tion between structural equations and ranking functions and is a strong-dominance
version of Lewis’ (1979: 472) conditions that “[i]t is of the first importance to
avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law” and that “[i]t is of the third im-
portance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law”, except that it is
relative to the causal model (see Menzies 2004).
We start with some terminology relative to an extended acyclic causal model
M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)). Say that a worldw = (~u, v1, . . . , vn) violates the equation
for the endogenous variable Vi if and only if vi , Fi
(
~u, v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn
)
.
Let V∗ (w) ⊆ V be the set of endogenous variables Vi such that w violates the
equation for Vi. Next say that a world w weakly Halpern-dominates a world
w′ if and only if for each endogenous variable X ∈ V∗ (w) \ V∗ (w′) there is
an endogenous variable X′ ∈ V∗ (w′) \ V∗ (w) such that X′ ∈ An (X). Fi-
nally say that a world w strongly Halpern-dominates a world w′ if and only if
w weakly Halpern-dominates w′, but w′ does not weakly Halpern-dominate w
(and soV∗ (w′) \ V∗ (w) is not empty).
Now we are in a position to formulate our first constraint. The idea is that
worlds that violate certain equations and then some are (counterfactually) more
distant than worlds that violate only certain equations. However, since a violation
of the equation for an endogenous variable early on in the causal hierarchy affects
everything causally downstream of that variable, a violation early on is worse –
infinitely worse – than a violation later on. If we adopt the terminology of Lewis
(1979), a violation of an equation early on in the causal hierarchy amounts to an
infinitely bigger miracle than a violation of an equation later on. This is why the
first constraint has to be stated in terms of ancestors.6
5In stressing that it is an art to come up with an appropriate model for a given scenario or case
Hitchcock (2007) states various constraints on appropriate models. His constraints concern the
relation between the model and the case to be modeled. In contrast to these the constraints I will
impose are inherent to the model and independent of the case to be modeled.
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An extended acyclic causal modelM =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) respects the equa-
tions if and only if the following holds for all worlds w and w′ inW: if w strongly
Halpern-dominates w′, then it holds for all contexts ~u in R (U): %~u (w) < %~u (w′).7
The idea behind respect for the equations is quite simple. First associate with
each world the set of endogenous variables whose equation the world violates.
Then, when comparing two given worlds for (counterfactual) distance, ignore
those endogenous variables whose equations are violated by both worlds. Finally
check whether, among the remaining endogenous variables, for each endogenous
variable whose equation is violated by the first world there is an endogenous vari-
able that is causally upstream and whose equation is violated by the second world.
In addition, check whether the converse is not true. In other words, check if any
violation in the first world is compensated for by a violation in the second world
that is worse, because it is further up in the causal hierarchy. In addition check if
the converse is not true. If so, then the first world is (counterfactually) less distant,
or closer, to any world than the second world. If the second world violates all the
equations that are violated by the first world and then some we have the special
case where, after ignoring the common violations, no violations in the first world
are left.
We are approaching the summit of this paper. My aim is to show that by ob-
jectively interpreting the ranking functions in them, causal models respecting the
equations can be subsumed under so called “counterfactual models”, because the
ranking functions thus interpreted yield all structural equations. In fact, counter-
factual models give us more than causal models, because they define truth con-
ditions for counterfactuals with arbitrary antecedents, something that is hard to
come by in the structural equations approach (Briggs 2012, Halpern 2008: sct.
5). Furthermore, in counterfactual models counterfactuals may not only be em-
bedded, but can also be iterated. Finally, the sentences in the formal language for
counterfactual models are built up from exogenous and endogenous variables.
6Woodward (2003: 141) can be read as endorsing our first constraint when he points to the
following “important general difference between Lewis’s scheme and the manipulationist picture.
On the manipulationist account [...] ”[l]ate” miracles, even numerous, are automatically preferred
to “early” miracles, even if single. By contrast, in Lewis’s theory, whether we [...] insert many
late miracles [...] or whether instead we [insert some early miracle] [...] depends on whether [the
effects] have many causes or just one. This sort of sensitivity leads to the insertion of miracles in
what, intuitively, is the wrong place.”
7The formulation of respect for the equations has undergone several changes. The present one
is due to Joseph Y. Halpern, for whose many most helpful comments and suggestions I am very
grateful.
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Here is the definition. M∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W) is a counterfactual model if and
only if S = (U,V,R) is a signature and, for each world w inW, %w :W→ N
is a ranking function on W. Rather than indexing the ranking functions to the
context ~u or the “legal” world w~u determined by that context, ranking functions
are now indexed to the set of all possible worlds. The reason is that truth is a
relation between sentences and possible worlds, and not between sentences and
contexts (or between sentences and “legal” worlds). This makes it necessary to be
explicit about the exogenous variables. From now onU is the set of m exogenous
variables {U1, . . . ,Um}.
An atomic sentence Xi = x, i = 1, . . . ,m + n, is true in M∗ in world w ∈
W if and only if w ∈ {(u1, . . . ,um, v1, . . . , vm) = (x1, . . . , xm+n) ∈ W : xi = x}.
Negations and conjunctions are defined as usual, and where φ and ψ are arbitrary
sentences, the counterfactual φ  ψ is true in the counterfactual modelM∗ in
the world w just in case all %w-minimal φ-worlds are ψ-worlds. The system V is
sound and complete with respect to this semantics (Huber ms 2).
In a causal model the structural equations are given and then used to define
truth conditions for a limited set of counterfactual conditionals. In a counterfac-
tual model the counterfactual conditionals are given via the ranking functions %w.
Therefore we have to say what it means for a structural equation represented by
some function F to hold in a counterfactual model. For this we first restrict the
functions F to those fromWi = ×X∈U∪V\{Vi}R (X) into R (Vi), for some endoge-
nous variable Vi fromV. Call such a function eligible for Vi.
A function F :Wi → R (Vi), which is eligible for Vi, holds in a counterfactual
modelM∗ just in case, for every world w inW, the following counterfactuals are
all true in M∗ in w: ~U ∪V \ {Vi} = ~wi  Vi = Fi ( ~wi), where ~wi is in Wi.
For an eligible function F to hold in a counterfactual model the above counter-
factuals must be true in every world in that model. In contrast to counterfactuals
in general, whose truth value is world-dependent, the structural equations hold
world-independently. In this sense they are necessarily true. Therefore talk of
“(causal) laws” is appropriate.
My thesis is that the one modality of counterfactuality suffices for actual cau-
sation and causality in general. We have seen why to subscribe to the insufficiency
thesis according to which “there must be more to causality than just the struc-
tural equations.” We should not infer from the insufficiency thesis that we need
a second modality. What we should infer from the insufficiency thesis is that the
limited set of counterfactuals we get from the structural equations is not enough
to represent the one relevant modality of counterfactuality.
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To put it bluntly: structural equations are insufficient and unnecessary for
causality. They are insufficient because they do not give us all counterfactuals,
and because they do not give us all correct causal claims. They are unnecessary
because we get them for free once we have moved beyond them, on to objective
ranking functions. This is the content of the following theorem, which completes
the first part of the third step of my argument as it was outlined in the Introduction.
The second part of the third step follows in the next chapter.
Theorem 1 For each extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U))
which respects the equations there is a counterfactual modelM∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W)
such that:
SE Fi holds inM iff Fi holds inM∗
D For all ~u ∈ R (U) and all w ∈ W: %~u (w) = %w~u (w), where w~u is the unique
solution to all equations inM in ~u.
Proof: Appendix 7.1. 
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5 Counterfactuality and Actuality
Let us look at the counterfactual models for our two examples if we use the rank-
ing functions from Halpern & Hitchcock (2010) and evaluate counterfactuals in
terms of them rather than the structural equations.
In the SURVIVAL example it is false in the actual context where Assassin does
not put in poison and Bodyguard puts in antidote (and Victim survives) that Victim
would not survive if Bodyguard did not put in antidote, B = 0  S , 1. The
reason is that one of the (counterfactually) least distant, or closest, worlds where
Bodyguard does not put in antidote, viz. the world where Bodyguard does not put
in antidote, Assassin does not put in poison, and Victim survives, is a world where
Victim survives.
In the FIRE example, version 2 it is true in the actual context where there are
lightning and an arsonist dropping a lit match (and a forest fire) that there would
be no forest fire if there were no arsonist dropping a lit match, M = 0 F , 1.
The reason is that all the (counterfactually) least distant, or closest, worlds where
there is no arsonist dropping a lit match, viz. the world where there is no arsonist
dropping a lit match, no lightning, and no forest fire, are also worlds where there
is no forest fire.
This means that theorem 1 is not enough. For it is not true that there would
be no lightning if there were no arsonist dropping a lit match. On the contrary,
even if there were no arsonist dropping a lit match, there would still be lightning,
and hence there would still be a forest fire. This is also how the counterfactual
M = 0 SE F , 1 is evaluated according to the structural models approach of
Halpern & Hitchcock (2010).
This highlights the fact that the counterfactuals defined in terms of the struc-
tural equations of a causal model and the counterfactuals defined in terms of a
counterfactual model may differ even if all and only the structural equations of
the causal model hold in the counterfactual model. So far the only counterfactu-
als the two approaches agree on are those with maximally specific antecedents:
~U ∪V \ {Vi} = ~wi (SE) Vi = Fi ( ~wi), where ~wi is in Wi. These are the
necessarily true “(causal) laws” that are true in all worlds or contexts.
Defeat is not the appropriate reaction to this mismatch, though. What the
mismatch shows is that we cannot define a counterfactual φ  ψ to be true
in a world w in a model M if and only if all %w-minimal antecedent worlds are
consequent worlds and interpret %w solely in terms of normality or typicality. For
that means that φ  ψ is true if φ-worlds normally are ψ-worlds. And that is
not right. More specifically, that is too weak.
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The LIGHTNING example due to Christopher R. Hitchcock (personal corre-
spondence) helps us see what is still missing to get the counterfactuals right. Let
exogenous variable L take on the value 1 if there is lightning, and 0 otherwise. Let
endogenous variable F take on the value 1 if there is a forest fire, and 0 otherwise.
The function FF : l 7→ f describes the following equation:
• L
• F = L
The equation says that there would be a forest fire if there were lightning. In the
context where there is lightning, L = 1, we want to say that (even) if there were
no forest fire there would (still) be lightning, F = 0  L = 1. That is, we
do not want our counterfactuals to backtrack. However, the world where there is
lightning and no forest fire violates the equation, whereas the world where there is
no lightning and no forest fire does not. Therefore, if all we require is respect for
the equations we get the wrong result that, in the context where there is lightning,
there would be no lightning if there were no forest fire, F = 0 L = 0. In order
to get the right result that there would (still) be lightning, (even) if there were no
forest fire, we additionally need to hold fixed what is actually true in the context
of evaluation.
When we formulate the antecedent of a counterfactual we keep fixed as much
of the actual context as is consistent with the antecedent. In the LIGHTNING ex-
ample we keep fixed that there is lightning. The same is true of the FIRE example,
version 2, where we also keep fixed that there is lightning. That is why it is true
that if there were no arsonist dropping a lit match there would still be lightning,
and hence there would still be a forest fire.8
8Note that we cannot hold fixed everything that is consistent with the antecedent. Consider the
counterfactual ‘If there were no lightning or no arsonist dropping a lit match, there would still be
a forest fire.’ This counterfactual has no truth-value on the structural models approach, even in its
generalized form, because the antecedent is a disjunction. On our counterfactual models account
this counterfactual does have a truth-value. Its antecedent is consistent with there being lightning.
Its antecedent is also consistent with there being an arsonist dropping a lit match. However, its
antecedent is not consistent with there jointly being lightning as well as an arsonist dropping a lit
match. Thus we cannot hold fixed everything that is consistent with the antecedent.
Nor can we hold fixed only what is common to all antecedent-worlds. For then we would only
consider worlds where there is neither lightning nor an arsonist dropping a lit match. The worlds
we want to consider are such that either there is lightning but no arsonist dropping a lit match, or
else there is no lightning but an arsonist dropping a lit match. For it is those worlds that hold fixed
as much of the actual context as is consistent with the antecedent.
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Consequently the second constraint concerns the relation between ranking
functions and actuality. It is a strong-dominance version of Lewis’ (1979: 472)
condition that “[i]t is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal
region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails”, except that it
is relative to the causal model (again, see Menzies 2004).
As before we start with some terminology relative to an extended acyclic
causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)). Say that a world w = (u1, . . . ,um, ~v)
differs from a world w+ =
(
u+1 , . . . ,u
+
m, ~v+
)
in the value for the exogenous variable
Ui if and only if ui , u+i . LetU∗w+ (w) be the set of exogenous variables for whose
value w differs from w+. Next say that a world w weakly dominates a world w′ in
terms of focus on a world w+ if and only ifU∗w+ (w) ⊆ U∗w+ (w′). Finally say that
a world w strongly dominates a world w′ in terms of focus on a world w+ if and
only if w weakly dominates w′ in terms of focus on w+, but w′ does not weakly
dominate w in terms of focus on w+.
Now we are in a position to formulate our second constraint. The idea is that
worlds that differ from the actual world in the values of certain exogenous vari-
ables and then some are (counterfactually) more distant from the actual world than
worlds that differ from the actual world only in the values for certain exogenous
variables. In contrast to the global constraint of respect for the equations focus on
actuality is a local constraint. This is so because what is actual varies from context
to context. And that is why we now quantify over contexts at the beginning of the
relevant clause.
An extended acyclic causal modelM =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) is focused on actu-
ality if and only if the following holds for all contexts ~u in R (U) and all worlds
w and w′ inW: if w strongly dominates w′ in terms of focus on the world w~u,
then: %~u (w) < %~u (w′).
However, we cannot simply demand of an extended acyclic causal model that
it satisfy focus on actuality in addition to respect for the equations. Focus on
actuality is more important than respect for the equations, as the above example
shows. For this reason, as well as to make sure that the two constraints do not
conflict with each other, respect for the equations has to be restricted to worlds
which agree on the values for the exogenous variables in U. This means that
we have a system of priorities rather than a system of weights (cf. Lewis 1979:
472, Kroedel & Huber forthcoming). Its content is that extended acyclic causal
models have to be focused on actuality and subsequently respect the equations in
the following sense. (Note that I have omitted this point in outlining my argument
in the Introduction.)
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An extended acyclic causal modelM =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) is focused on ac-
tuality and subsequently respects the equations if and only if M is focused on
actuality and the following holds for all worlds w and w′ inW that agree on the
values of the exogenous variablesU: if w strongly Halpern-dominates w′, then it
holds for all contexts ~u in R (U): %~u (w) < %~u (w′).
For extended acyclic causal models which are focused on actuality and sub-
sequently respect the equations the mismatch between the truth-values of coun-
terfactuals in the structural models approach and in the counterfactual models
account disappears. This is the content of the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For each extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U))
which is focused on actuality and subsequently respects the equations there is
a counterfactual modelM∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W) such that:
C For all statements φ in the language of the generalized version of Halpern
& Hitchcock (2010) and all contexts ~u ∈ R (U):
φ is true inM in ~u according to the structural equations approach iff φ is
true inM∗ in w~u according to the counterfactual models account.
Proof: Appendix 7.2. 
This almost completes the third step of my argument as it was outlined in the
Introduction. There is one more twist to the story that will be topic of the next
section when we put things together. However, before doing so I want to present a
slightly different formulation of focus on actuality and subsequent respect for the
equations that may be more accessible.
Respect for the equations is a global constraint on the endogenous variables
and the structural equations governing them. Focus on actuality is a local con-
straint on the exogenous variables and their values in a given context. The dis-
tinction between exogenous and endogenous variables is relative to the model,
and an exogenous variable may become endogenous if one refines a model by
including further variables. Therefore one may sometimes want to think of the
exogenous variables as potentially endogenous, governed by structural equations
that are temporarily set to a constant value for practical purposes, say, for the
model to be simple.
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From this point of view it is natural to adopt the following terminology rel-
ative to an extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)). Say that
the equation for an exogenous variable U j in context ~u = (u1, . . . ,um) is rep-
resented by the constant function Fu j :
(
u1 . . . ,u j−1,u j+1, . . . ,um, ~v
)
7→ u j from
×X∈U∪V\{U j}R (X) into R
(
U j
)
. Next say that a world w =
(
u1, . . . ,um, ~v
)
violates
the equation for the exogenous variable U j in context ~u+ =
(
u+1 , . . . ,u
+
m
)
if and
only if u j , Fu+j
(
u1, . . . ,u j−1,u j+1, . . . ,um, ~v
)
= u+j . Let X∗~u (w) ⊆ U ∪ V be
the set of exogenous or endogenous variables X such that w violates the equa-
tion for X (in context ~u). Finally say that an extended acyclic causal model
M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) is respectful if and only if the following holds for all
contexts ~u and all worlds w and w′ in W: if for each exogenous or endoge-
nous variable X ∈ X∗
~u
(w) \V∗
~u
(w′) there is an exogenous or endogenous variable
X′ ∈ V∗
~u
(w′) \ V∗
~u
(w) such that X′ ∈ An (X), but the converse does not hold,
then: %~u (w) < %~u (w′).
Respectfulness is a mixed constraint on the exogenous and endogenous vari-
ables of a model, the values of the former in a given context, and the structural
equations governing the latter in all contexts. It unifies the prioritized combina-
tion of focus on actuality and subsequent respect for the equations and allows us
to state the following (strictly weaker) corollary of theorem 2.
Theorem 3 For each extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U))
which is respectful there is a counterfactual modelM∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W) such that:
C For all statements φ in the language of the generalized version of Halpern
& Hitchcock (2010) and all contexts ~u ∈ R (U):
φ is true inM in ~u according to the structural equations approach iff φ is
true inM∗ in w~u according to the counterfactual models account.
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6 Beyond Structural Equations
It is time to put things together. Typicality and actuality can come apart. Actuality
matters for counterfactuality. So, one might think, even counterfactual models are
insufficient for causality. However, consider Spohn’s (2006) account of causation.
He starts out with a ranking function % over a set of possible worlds which is gen-
erated by a set of singular variables in the same way as ours. Spohn interprets the
ranking function % subjectively in terms of grades of disbelief. He defines actual
causation in terms of the conditional ranking function % (· | Hw), where Hw is the
complete history of the actual world w up to right before the effect, but excluding
the cause (a temporal ordering relation over the variables allows Spohn to give a
precise definition of this clause). So the seemingly objective nature of actual cau-
sation in this purely subjective account is partially captured by conditionalizing
on what is actually the case.
This paves the way for the final move, suggested by Wolfgang Spohn (personal
correspondence). Let us follow Halpern & Hitchcock (2010) in interpreting the
unconditional ranking functions in terms of typicality. Furthermore, suppose our
extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) respects the equations.
Typicality and actuality come apart in context ~u only if the unconditional ranking
function %~u and the conditional ranking function %~u
(
· | ~U = ~u
)
differ for the rank
assigned to some proposition Ui = ui, for some exogenous variable Ui and some
value ui in R (Ui). But nothing forces us to use the unconditional ranking function
%~u in evaluating counterfactuals in ~u. We are free to use the conditional ranking
function %~u
(
· | ~U = ~u
)
to evaluate counterfactuals in ~u.
Here is a restricted, but hopefully more comprehensible version of the main
result detailed below. Suppose the modelMwith its family of unconditional rank-
ing functions
(
%~u
)
~u∈R(U) respects the equations. This implies that the modelM ~U
with the family of conditional ranking functions
(
%~u
(
· | ~U = ~u
))
~u∈R(U) is focused
on actuality and subsequently respects the equations, provided we momentarily
exclude the exogenous variables from the sentences of our language (this assump-
tion will be dropped below). The conditional ranking functions give us the coun-
terfactuals in the various contexts (or worlds, if we do not exclude the exogenous
variables from the sentences of our language). If two scenarios or cases agree on
the conditional ranking functions and the counterfactuals they represent, as is the
case for the FIRE example, version 2 and of the SURVIVAL example, they may
still differ in the unconditional ranking functions they arise from and the defaults
these latter represent. We do not need to introduce a second element in our model.
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In a nutshell causality and counterfactuality interact in the following way. Typ-
icality is represented by the unconditional or “prior” ranking functions. Coun-
terfactuality includes typicality, but goes beyond it by respecting the equations
and, in the context of causality, by being focused on actuality (and subsequently
respecting the equations). In the context of causality, counterfactuality is rep-
resented by the conditional or “posterior” ranking functions that arise from the
unconditional ranking functions by conditionalizing on what is actually the case.
Both unconditional as well as conditional ranking functions are to respect the
equations. In addition to this the latter, but not the former, are to be focused on
actuality. As a consequence, the latter, but not the former, do not represent typi-
cality anymore, if, as may happen, typicality and actuality come apart. As Lewis
might put it, typicality “is of little or no importance” (Lewis 1979: 472).
Even though conditionalizing on what is actually the case may erase the traces
of typicality, we can still refer back to the unconditional roots. This is exactly what
we do if we adopt Halpern & Hitchcock’s (2010) definition of actual causation. In
the relevant clause (2) we use the unconditional ranking function to determine the
default values of the variables, whereas we use the conditional ranking function
to determine the truth-values of the counterfactuals. Halpern & Hitchcock (2010)
use two different formalisms, viz. structural equations and ranking functions, to
represent the “(causal) laws” and typicality, respectively. I use just one formalism,
viz. objective ranking functions, that, due to its conditional nature, is sufficiently
rich to capture both of these dimensions of counterfactuality.9
Things are more complicated if we allow for exogenous variables in the sen-
tences of our language. Then the following more general move has to be made.
Take M with its family of unconditional ranking functions (%~u)~u∈R(U). Instead
of strictly conditionalizing every %~u on ~U = ~u to obtain the model M ~U with
its family of conditional ranking functions
(
%~u
(
· | ~U = ~u
))
~u∈R(U), merely Shenoy
conditionalize every %~u on ~U = ~u by an appropriately chosen number max to
obtain the model Mmax
~U with its family of “Shenoy shifted” ranking functions(
%~u
(
· ↑ ~U = ~u
))
~u∈R(U).
Shenoy conditionalization is defined as follows. If % : ℘ (W) → N ∪ {∞}
is the unconditional ranking function on the powerset overW, ℘ (W), then the
result of Shenoy conditionalizing % on the proposition A from ℘ (W) by rank
9It should be noted that this story cannot be told on an account of counterfactuals such as Lewis’
(1973) or Stalnaker’s (1968), because these accounts lack the operation of conditionalisation: there
are no such things as a conditional sphere of similarity or conditional selection functions.
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k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, %A↑k, is defined as follows. For each B from ℘ (W),
%A↑k (B) = min
{
% (B ∩ A) + 0 −min, %
(
B ∩ A
)
+ k −min
}
,
where min = min
{
0 + % (A) , k + %
(
A
)}
is a normalization parameter which de-
pends on the ranking function % which is to be updated, the partition
{
A,A
}
, and
the input parameters {0, k} by which the elements A,A of the partition are shifted.
The effect of normalizing by min is that at least one possible world is assigned
rank 0 rather than rank min. Strictly conditionalizing % on A results in the same
ranking function as Shenoy conditionalizing % on A by ∞ so that M ~U = M∞~U.
Shenoy conditionalization was introduced by Shenoy (1991). It is the ranktheo-
retic counterpart to probability theory’s Field conditionalization (Field 1978).
The family of Shenoy shifted ranking functions in terms of which we evaluate
counterfactuals results from the original family of unconditional ranking func-
tions by a series of m Shenoy shifts, one for each exogenous variable U j. We start
with %~u =: %0 from the family
(
%~u
)
~u∈R(U), which, following Halpern & Hitchcock
(2010), we interpret in terms of typicality. What we need to do is to Shenoy con-
ditionalize on what is actually the case in context ~u = (u1, . . . ,um). We do this by
first Shenoy conditionalizing %0 on U1 = u1 by max = max
{
%~u (w) : w ∈ W}+1,
which is sufficiently large but finite. This has two effects. First, all worlds that dif-
fer from the actual world w~u in the value for the exogenous variable U1 are shifted
upwards by max − min1, where min1 depends, among others, on %0. Second, all
worlds that agree with the actual world w~u on the value for the exogenous variable
U1 are shifted downwards by min1 (and so at least one of those latter worlds is
assigned rank 0). The result is %0,U1=u1↑max =: %1.
We continue by Shenoy conditionalizing %1 on U2 = u2 by max to obtain
%1,U2=u2↑max =: %2 and so on until we finally arrive at %m−1,Um=um↑max = %m =:
%~u
(
· ↑ ~U = ~u
)
. %m differs from the original %0 in that worlds that differ from the
actual world w~u in the value for exactly k exogenous variables have been shifted
upwards or further away by k ·max, modulo normalization.
The first thing this means is that the model with the Shenoy shifted ranking
functions %ms instead of the unconditional ranking functions %~us is focused on
actuality. By the choice of max every world that differs from the actual world
in the value of some exogenous variable now has a higher rank than any world
that agrees with the actual world in the value of all exogenous variables. More
generally, every world that dominates another world in terms of focus on the actual
world is assigned a smaller rank than the dominated world.10
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The second thing this mean is that, in the Shenoy shifted ranking functions %m,
the relative position of two worlds that agree on the values for the exogenous vari-
ables is the same as it is in the unconditional ranking functions %~u (the two worlds
are always shifted together). Therefore the model with the Shenoy shifted ranking
functions %m instead of the unconditional ranking functions %~u still respects the
equations for those worlds that agree on the values for the exogenous variables.
Therefore the modelMmax
~U , call it the appropriate Shenoy shift ofM on ~U,
with its family of Shenoy shifted ranking functions
(
%~u
(
· ↑ ~U = ~u
))
~u∈R(U) is fo-
cused on actuality and subsequently respects the equations, if the extended acyclic
causal modelM with its family of unconditional ranking functions (%~u)~u∈R(U) re-
spects the equations.
In the same way we can form the appropriate Shenoy shiftM∗max
~U of a coun-
terfactual modelM∗. As the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 make clear,M∗max
~U con-
structed in this way is one of the counterfactual modelsMmax∗
~U that exist for each
extended acyclic causal model Mmax
~U which is focused on actuality and subse-
quently respects the equations. Thus we arrive at
Theorem 4 For each extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U))
which respects the equations and its appropriate Shenoy shiftMmax
~U which is fo-
cused on actuality and subsequently respects the equations there is a counterfac-
tual modelM∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W) and its appropriate Shenoy shiftM∗max~U such that:
SE Fi holds inM iff Fi holds inMmax~U iff Fi holds inM∗ iff Fi holds inM∗max~U
D For all ~u ∈ R (U) and all w ∈ W: %~u (w) = %w~u (w), where w~u is the unique
solution to all the equations ofM in ~u.
C For all statements φ in the language of the generalized version of Halpern
& Hitchcock (2010) and all contexts ~u ∈ R (U):
φ is true inM in ~u according to the structural equations approach iff
φ is true inMmax
~U in ~u according to the structural equations approach iff
φ is true inM∗max
~U in w~u according to the counterfactual models account.
10Shenoy conditionalizing just once on the conjunction ~U = ~u by max does not guarantee that
the resulting model is focused on actuality, because in that case all that matters is whether a world
differs from the actual world in the value for at least one or no exogenous variable.
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Theorem 4 shows that we can do everything with objective ranking functions that
we can do with structural equations together with normality or typicality, and
more. It does not show that we can do everything. The reason I am belaboring the
obvious is that it may well be that someone comes up with examples which are
modeled by isomorphic counterfactual models, and of which it is claimed that the
“intuitively correct” causal judgments differ (see, however, Glymour et al. 2010).
In the same way one may come up with examples which are modeled by ex-
tended acyclic causal models in which, “intuitively”, respect for the equations
does not hold. The following one due to Christopher R. Hitchcock (personal cor-
respondence) might be a case in point. I think it is not, because counterfactuality
trumps typicality in the sense that the most typical A∧C-worlds are more typical
than the most typical A ∧ ¬C-worlds if A C is true.
Here is Hitchcock’s VICTIM example. Let exogenous variable A take on the
value 1 if Assassin shoots, and 0 otherwise. Let endogenous variable B take on
the value 1 if Backup shoots, and 0 otherwise. Let endogenous variable V take
on the value 1 if Victim dies, and 0 otherwise. The functions FB : a 7→ 1 − a and
FV : (a, b) 7→ max {a, b} describe the following equations:
• A
• B = 1 − A
• V = A ∨ B
In every context, it is less typical for Assassin as well as Backup to shoot than not
to shoot, and for Victim to die than not to die.
The first equation implies that Backup would shoot if Assassin did not shoot.
Respect for the equations forces us to say that the world where Assassin does not
shoot, Backup does not shoot, and Victim does not die is less typical than the
world where Assassin does not shoot, Backup shoots, and Victim does not die.
The reason is that the latter world strongly Halpern-dominates the former world:
the latter world violates the equation for V (an no other equation), the former
world violates the equation for B (and no other equation), and B ∈ An (V), but
V < An (B). For a similar reason we have to say that the world where Assassin
does not shoot and Backup does not shoot and Victim dies is less typical than the
world where Assassin does not shoot, Backup shoots, and Victim dies.
Therefore we must say that it is more typical that Assassin does not shoot
and Backup shoots than that Assassin does not shoot and Backup does not shoot.
I think this is correct, because it conforms with the counterfactual that Backup
would shoot if Assassin did not shoot.
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Another example is the PEN example mentioned in Halpern & Hitchcock
(forthcoming). Let endogenous variable PS take on the value 1 if Professor Smith
takes a pen, and 0 otherwise. Let endogenous variable CP take on the value 1 if
the department chair institutes a policy forbidding faculty members from taking
pens, and 0 otherwise. Let exogenous variable PO take on the value 1 if a problem
occurs, and 0 otherwise. The function F : c 7→ c describes the following equation:
• CP
• PS
• PO = PS
It is more typical for Professor Smith to not take a pen than to take a pen. In the
context where the department chair institutes a policy forbidding faculty members
from taking pens, CP = 1, and where Professor Smith takes a pen, PS = 1, it is
true that Professor Smith would (still) take a pen (even) if the department chair
instituted a policy forbidding faculty members from taking pens, CP = 1 
PS = 1. So far so good.
Here is the important point. Halpern & Hitchcock (forthcoming) claim that it
is more “typical” that the department chair institutes a policy forbidding faculty
members from taking pens and Professor Smith does not take a pen than that the
department chair institutes a policy forbidding faculty members from taking pens
and Professor Smith takes a pen. The reason is that Professor Smith violates a
norm when he takes a pen in the context where the department chair institutes
a policy forbidding faculty members from taking pens. This norm, or rather its
violation, is claimed to have an impact on what is typical in that context.
However, what Halpern & Hitchcock (forthcoming) call “typicality” involves
a deontic modality. The PEN example contains the conditional obligation that
Professor Smith should not take a pen given that the department chair institutes
a policy forbidding faculty members from taking pens, Ought (PS = 0 | CP = 1).
And while I hold the view that typicality or normality respects for the equations,
I do not hold the view that deontic modalities do. Quite the opposite is the case.
Given that the department chair institutes a policy forbidding faculty members
from taking pens, Professor Smith should not, but (still) would, take a pen. This,
I submit, implies that is less typical that the department chair institutes a policy
forbidding faculty members from taking pens and Professor Smith does not take a
pen than that the department chair institutes a policy forbidding faculty members
from taking pens and Professor Smith takes a pen.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 For each extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U))
which respects the equations there is a counterfactual modelM∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W)
such that:
SE Fi holds inM iff Fi holds inM∗
D For all ~u ∈ R (U) and all w ∈ W: %~u (w) = %w~u (w), where w~u is the unique
solution to all equations inM in ~u.
Proof:
LetM =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) be an extended acyclic causal model which respects
the equations. I will construct a counterfactual modelM∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W) with
the appropriate features. Take S fromM.
For each context ~u ∈ R (U) the equations in F determine a unique “legal”
world w~u ∈ W. W0 = {w~u ∈ W : ~u ∈ R (U)} is the set of all “legal” worlds,
i.e. the set of all worlds that satisfy all equations. For w~u ∈ W0 we define
%w~u (w) = %~u (w) for all w ∈ W. For the “illegal” worlds w ∈ W \W0 which
violate at least one equation we let the ranking functions %w copy an arbitrary
ranking function %w~u , w~u ∈ W0. The counterfactual modelM∗ constructed in this
way satisfies D. It remains to be shown that it also satisfies SE.
Let Fi represent the equation for Vi, i = 1, . . . ,n. Obviously Fi is eligible
for Vi. We have to show that Fi holds in M∗. This means we have to show for
every world w ∈ W that the following counterfactuals are all true in M∗ in w:
~U ∪V \ {Vi} = ~wi  Vi = Fi ( ~wi), where ~wi ∈ Wi = ×X∈U∪V\{Vi}R (X). Since
the %ws for the “illegal” worlds w ∈ W \W0 copy some %w~u , for a “legal” world
w~u ∈ W0, it suffices to show that this holds for every “legal” world w~u ∈ W0.
Each antecedent of the form ~U ∪V \ {Vi} = ~wi, for ~wi ∈ Wi, is true in the set
of worlds
{(
~wi, vi
)
: vi ∈ R (Vi)}. There is exactly one v∗i ∈ R (Vi), viz. the value Fi
assigns to ~wi, such that
(
~wi, v∗i
)
does not violate the equation for Vi. For all other
vi ∈ R (Vi) the resulting world ( ~wi, vi) violates the equation for the endogenous
variable Vi. Hence Vi ∈ V∗ ( ~wi, vi) \ V∗ ( ~wi, v∗i ) for all vi , v∗i . Furthermore,(
~wi, v∗i
)
and
(
~wi, vi
)
agree on the values of all variables other than Vi.
31
Suppose X ∈ V∗
(
~wi, v∗i
)
\ V∗ ( ~wi, vi) for an arbitrary vi , v∗i . Since ( ~wi, v∗i )
and
(
~wi, vi
)
agree on the value of X, and since, by assumption,
(
~wi, vi
)
does not
violate the equation for X, there must be an exogenous or endogenous variable
Y such that Y ∈ An (X) and
(
~wi, v∗i
)
and
(
~wi, vi
)
do not agree on the value of
Y. Since
(
~wi, v∗i
)
and
(
~wi, vi
)
agree on the values of all variables other than Vi,
this variable Y must be Vi. That is, if X ∈ V∗
(
~wi, v∗i
)
\ V∗ ( ~wi, vi), then Vi ∈
An (X). Since Vi ∈ V∗ ( ~wi, vi) \V∗ ( ~wi, v∗i ) for all vi , v∗i , this means that ( ~wi, v∗i )
weakly Halpern-dominates
(
~wi, vi
)
. Since, in acyclic causal models, X < An (Vi)
if Vi ∈ An (X), and since Vi ∈ V∗ ( ~wi, vi) \ V∗ ( ~wi, v∗i ), ( ~wi, vi) does not weakly
Halpern-dominate
(
~wi, v∗i
)
.
Respect for the equations implies that %~u
((
~wi, v∗i
))
< %~u
((
~wi, vi
))
for all vi ,
v∗i . Since Vi = Fi
(
~wi
)
is true in
(
~wi, v∗i
)
it follows that all %~u-minimal, i.e. all %w~u-
minimal, antecedent worlds are consequent worlds. And this is so for all contexts
~u ∈ R (U), i.e. all “legal” worlds w~u ∈ W0.
The if-direction follows from the fact that, for each endogenous variable Vi, at
most one eligible function holds in a given counterfactual modelM∗. For two such
functions F and F′ differ only if there is a ~wi such that F
(
~wi
)
, F′
(
~wi
)
. In that case
the two counterfactuals ~U ∪V \ {Vi} = ~wi  Vi = F ( ~wi) and ~U ∪V \ {Vi} =
~wi  Vi = F′
(
~wi
)
have inconsistent consequents, and so cannot be jointly true
at any world w. 
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 For each extended acyclic causal model M =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U))
which is focused on actuality and subsequently respects the equations there is
a counterfactual modelM∗ =
(
S, (%w)w∈W) such that:
C For all statements φ in the language of the generalized version of Halpern
& Hitchcock (2010) and all contexts ~u ∈ R (U):
φ is true inM in ~u according to the structural equations approach iff φ is
true inM∗ in w~u according to the counterfactual models account.
Proof: LetM =
(
S,F , (%~u)~u∈R(U)) be an extended acyclic causal model which is
focused on actuality and subsequently respects the equations. ConstructM∗ as in
the proof of theorem 1.
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Suppose φ is an atomic sentence of the form Xi = x for some exogenous
or endogenous variable Xi. If φ is true in M in context ~u this means that x is
the value of Xi in the unique solution w~u to all the equations in F . But then
w~u ∈ {(u1, . . . ,um, v1, . . . , vn) = (x1, . . . , xm+n) : xi = x}. Conversely, if φ is not
true in M in context ~u this means that x is not the value of Xi in the unique
solution w~u to all the equations in F , in which case w~u < {(x1, . . . , xm+n) : xi = x}.
Now suppose φ is Boolean. Since negations and conjunctions are defined in
the same way in the structural equations approach and the counterfactual models
account φ is true inM in context ~u iff φ is true inM∗ in “legal” world w~u.
Finally, suppose φ is of the form X1 = x1∧ . . .∧Xk = xk  ψ, for short: ~X =
~x ψ, where ψ is Boolean. Then φ is true inM in ~u according to the structural
equations account just in case ψ is true in that model M~X=~x =
(
S~X,F ~X=~x
)
and
that context ~u~X=~x that result fromM and ~u by replacing the equations for Xi by
the equations Xi = xi, i = 1, . . . , k. On the other hand, φ is true inM∗ in w~u just
in case all %w~u-minimal ~X = ~x-worlds are ψ-worlds.
It suffices to consider the case where ψ is an atomic sentence of the form
Zi = z. In this case ψ is true in the first sense just in case z is the value of Zi in the
unique solution w~X=~x
~u~X=~x
=: w∗ to all equations represented by F ~X=~x in context ~u~X=~x.
We need to show that w∗ is the one and only %w~u-minimal ~X = ~x-world. w
∗
is an ~X = ~x-world and differs from any other ~X = ~x-world w′ at most in the
values assigned toU ∪V \ {X1, . . . ,Xk}. w∗ agrees with w~u in the values for the
exogenous variables U \ {X1, . . . ,Xk}. Therefore, if an ~X = ~x-world w′ differs
from w∗ in the value of some exogenous variable U, w′ differs also from w~u in the
value of U. This means that w∗ dominates any such world w′ in terms of focus on
w~u. Focus on actuality implies that any such world w′ has a higher rank in w~u and
so is not among the %~u-minimal ~X = ~x-worlds.
This leaves only ~X = ~x-worlds which differ from w∗ in at most the values for
the endogenous variables V \ {X1, . . . ,Xk}. Let w′ be such a world and suppose
X ∈ V∗ (w∗) \ V∗ (w′). Since w∗ satisfies the equations for all endogenous vari-
ablesV\{X1, . . . ,Xk}, it must be that X ∈ {X1, . . . ,Xk}. Since w′ and w∗ agree on
the values of X1, . . . ,Xk, and since, by assumption, w′ satisfies the equation for
X, there must be an exogenous or endogenous variable Y such that Y ∈ An (X)
and w′ and w∗ differ in the value for Y. The latter implies that Y is endogenous,
but not not among X1, . . . ,Xk, and therefore w∗ does not violate the equation for
Y. If w′ violates the equation for Y, we are done. So suppose w′ does not violate
the equation for Y.
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w∗ and w′ agree on the values of U as well as X1, . . . ,Xk, w∗ satisfies the
equations for V \ {X1, . . . ,Xk}, and Y ∈ V \ {X1, . . . ,Xk}. Hence, if w′ satisfies
the equation for Y, there must be an exogenous or endogenous variable Z such
that Z ∈ An (Y) ⊆ An (X) and w′ and w∗ differ in the value of Z. As before
it follows that Z is endogenous, but not among X1, . . . ,Xk, and that w∗ satisfies
the equation for Z. If w′ violates the equation for Z, we are done. If not, there
must be another endogenous variable Z′ ∈ An (Z) ⊆ An (Y) ⊆ An (X) with the
same properties. Since there are only finitely many variables, and since the model
is acyclic, we finally arrive at an endogenous variable Z∗ ∈ An (X) such that w′
violates the equation for Z∗, but w∗ does not. Hence w∗ weakly Halpern-dominates
w′.
Note thatV∗ (w′) \ V∗ (w∗) is not empty, if w′ differs from w∗. For suppose it
is. Then all variables whose equation are violated by w′ are also violated by w∗.
Since w∗ does not violate the equations forV \ {X1, . . . ,Xk}, and since w′ and w∗
agree on the values ofU as well as X1, . . . ,Xk, w′ and w∗ agree on the values for
all variables, and thus are identical.
Since, in acyclic models, X < An (Z∗) if Z∗ ∈ An (X), and since Z∗ ∈ V∗ (w′)\
V∗ (w∗) for at least one endogenous variable Z∗, w′ does not weakly Halpern-
dominate w∗. Focus on actuality and subsequent respect for the equations implies
that any such world w′ has a higher rank in w~u and so is not among the %~u-minimal
~X = ~x-worlds. 
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